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7TH ANNUAL U.S.-CHINA STRATEGIC DIALOGUE	  NPS	  AND	  PACIFIC	  FORUM	  HOSTED,	  SPONSORED	  BY	  DTRA,	  IN	  HAWAII,	  JUNE	  2012	  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
	   	  
In early June, 2012, eight Chinese participants, including high-ranking Peoples Liberation Army 
(PLA) officers, met with twenty-five Americans (a mix of officials and researchers) to discuss 
bilateral nuclear issues at an unofficial meeting.  This dialogue, funded by DTRA, has been held 
annually for the past seven years.  The Chinese delegation was the most official ever received in 
Hawaii, and the participants actively engaged in the discussions.  The delegation included active duty 
military officers, retired officers, think tank researchers, academic faculty, and a space security 
expert.  Our Chinese institutional co-host from the China Arms Control and Disarmament 
Association (CACDA) emphasized that these dialogues (in Hawaii and a parallel annual meeting in 
Beijing) are valued in Beijing and feed into the Track I process on their side both through their 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ministry of National Defense (MND). 
 
The overall tone was positive and substantive.  Boilerplate concerns about U.S. policy in the region 
were kept to a minimum, although China continues to express concerns about U.S. ballistic missile 
defense (BMD) programs and conventional strike capabilities. China’s “no-first-use” (NFU) of 
nuclear weapons policy served as backdrop for some of the discussion, constraining engagement 
with some issues, and illustrating the depth to which that policy shapes even well-connected official 
perceptions.  
 
Chinese participants displayed increasing confidence in their second strike capabilities and reiterated 
that their view of deterrence requires a very modest number of warheads.  They also welcome U.S. 
declaratory policy of not challenging “strategic stability” with China as a positive development and 
raised questions as to whether a “new type of strategic stability” might exist at vastly lower force 
levels than during the Cold War.  Chinese participants made increased references to their emerging 
SSBN force, hinting at potential “bastioning” strategies.   
 
Chinese emphasis on their NFU policy impeded discussion on a range of topics.  Discussions of 
crisis stability, nuclear signaling, and war control (战争控制, which is used widely in PLA sources) 
were limited by invocations of NFU.  The Chinese repeatedly characterized “war control” as a non-
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nuclear term in their lexicon, and argued that they did not practice “nuclear signaling” since that has 
a coercive legacy (from the 1950s) for them.  When American participants cited examples from PLA 
writings of actions that appeared to be signaling (e.g., raising alert status), the Chinese characterized 
this as “reactive signaling” at most and noted that such steps enhanced their capabilities directly.  
Chinese participants emphasized that nuclear retaliation would be complete, involving the launch of 
all nuclear weapons that survived a first strike.  According to Chinese experts, its NFU pledge and 
limited nuclear capabilities left no role for a nuclear warfighting strategy, and little role for nuclear 
signaling or the use of nuclear weapons for war control or intra-war deterrence.  
  
U.S. BMD programs remain a substantial concern for China.  Both national missile defense and 
(particularly) regional missile defense are viewed as a threat to the effectiveness of Chinese second 
strike capabilities.  Chinese participants feared that advanced missile defense systems deployed near 
China’s coast might be able to intercept Chinese ICBMs.  Reassuring the Chinese on this point—
central to their threat perceptions—would require additional bilateral engagement on missile defense 
confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) such as burn out velocities, test observations, 
etc., as has been done with the Russians.  Clearly, and as U.S. participants noted, potential leaking of 
this information to “third parties” like North Korea would impede such CSBMs. Nevertheless, these 
ideas were raised in Hawaii and are worth discussing in official channels. 
 
In the conventional arena, some Chinese acknowledge that anti-access and area denial (A2/AD)-like 
capabilities and Air-Sea Battle (ASB) have some elements of an arms race.  Beyond that, China views 
“rebalancing” as both surprising and military-centric.  Chinese participants see U.S. submarine 
(re)deployments in Asia (SSGN, SSN, and earlier SSBN) and advanced conventional weapons as 
powerful military capabilities. 
 
A bilateral discussion of space security was included on the agenda for the first time with the 
permission of Chinese officials and military-affiliated think tanks.  “Weaponization” of space is 
regarded as the greatest threat in space, but Chinese participants made clear they lacked consensus 
on the definition of “weaponization” or “space weapons.”  One Chinese expert expressed flexibility 
on the Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use 
of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), referring to it as only a starting point and in need of 
improvement.  Recent U.S. overtures on the Code of Conduct are not well understood; in particular, 
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China views recent American proposals as a means to exert unilateral leadership on these issues.  
U.S. intentions to broaden the Code discussions beyond European leadership and to accept inputs 
from others (and China in particular) need to be emphasized.  Chinese presentations expressed a 
positive official view of the Code of Conduct as “parallel” to the Prevention of an Arms Race in 
Outer Space initiative (PAROS) and that it “would by no means dilute” PAROS.  More broadly, 
while calling for legally binding agreements as the epitome of cooperation in space, one Chinese 
participant expressed support for separate “Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures 
(TCBMs),” and some participants were interested in ideas such as a weapons test moratorium and 
protection for global utilities in space.  Chinese participants, however, noted that limitations on civil 
space exchanges with America have led to concerns about the possibility of cooperation on anything 
related to space. 
 
Cross-domain issues were also explicitly raised on the agenda for the first time.  The Chinese side 
acknowledged an intrinsic interaction between space/cyber and other domains and also displayed an 
emerging awareness that the United States views attacks on cyber or space as potentially very 
escalatory. 
 
Finally, there were some interesting discussions on other CSBMs.  Prompted by one U.S. 
participant, some Chinese seemed to view negotiated structured verification measures as potentially 
more acceptable than generic “transparency.”  China may well view such private exchanges of 
information (particularly in a multilateral context) as less threatening than general “transparency,” 
which has broader implications in Chinese politics.  On the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty, Chinese participants once again averred that Chinese ratification would rapidly follow U.S. 
ratification.  And lastly, it is clear there continues to be an ongoing discussion of when is the 
appropriate time for China to join in broader nuclear arms control discussions.   In this meeting, a 
900-1000 warhead threshold was mentioned by one participant, although not in a particularly 
authoritative fashion.  This emphasizes—consistent with previous discussions—that such conditions 
are actively under discussion in China and are likely to be broader than simply warhead numbers, to 
include concerns such as non-deployed warheads and missile defense. 
 
*The following report is split into two parts. The first provides background and narrative analysis of this year’s 
meeting and the second focuses on the particular terms that each side discussed in a terminology exercise. 
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PART 1: BACKGROUND AND NARRATIVE ANALYSIS 
The seventh annual session of the U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue was held in Maui, Hawaii, from 
June 8 to 9, 2012.  The dialogue is a Track 1.5 conference; thus, it is formally unofficial but includes 
a mix of government and academic participants. It is organized by the Naval Postgraduate School’s 
(NPS) Center on Contemporary Conflict and Pacific Forum CSIS (Center for Strategic and 
International Studies) and is funded and guided by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s 
(DTRA) Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Combating WMD (PASCC).  Building on 
previous less formal support, for the first time, this year’s dialogue had a Chinese co-host, the China 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (CACDA).  This “non-governmental” association, with 
close ties to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and People’s Liberation Army (PLA), helped 
improve the level and quality of participants and secure support for discussing certain topics. 
 
As the leading agency responsible for addressing threats from weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 
DTRA seeks to enhance American situational awareness of Chinese nuclear strategies and 
capabilities, reduce the prospects for proliferation in Asia and beyond, and more broadly enhance 
American deterrence in a time of transformation. Particular interests guiding DTRA’s leadership of 
this project have focused on identifying important misperceptions, misunderstandings, and key 
divergences in national interests, with a goal of reducing these over the long term. 
 
Thus, the goal of this series of annual meetings has been to identify important misperceptions 
regarding each side’s nuclear strategy and doctrine and highlight potential areas of cooperation or 
confidence building measures that might reduce such dangers. The first six conferences of this series 
focused their discussions on general perceptions of the utility of nuclear weapons, national threat 
perceptions in strategic affairs, the nature of current nuclear strategy and operational concepts of 
each side, regional issues pertaining to nuclear weapons issues, and strategic stability.  (Conference 
reports for the previous year’s dialogues have been published and are available on NPS web pages or 
from this report’s authors.) 
 
This year, the participants on the U.S. side included participants from think tanks such as CSIS and 
the Nuclear Threat Initiative; universities such NPS, the National Defense University, and Stanford; 
and observers from the State Department, the Department of Defense, DTRA, and Strategic 
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Command.  In total, there were more than 20 American participants.  On the Chinese side, 
participants included a mix of active (mostly) and retired senior PLA officers, experts from “official” 
civilian Chinese think tanks, and a scholar from a Chinese university.   
 
One of the goals of this series of meetings is to create something of a community of regular 
participants who develop some accumulated learning and perhaps some personal trust that might 
facilitate a more open discussion.  Typically, at least half of the attendees have participated in a 
previous dialogue, as was the case this year. 
 
This meeting was organized around four substantive panels, a set of terminology definitional 
breakout groups, and one plenary session discussion of definitions. The meeting began with wide-
ranging discussions about U.S. and Chinese views on the evolving strategic environment and nuclear 
strategy, especially in the context of American rebalancing in the Pacific. This topic helped force 
both sides to examine the conditions in the Asia-Pacific that might promote a healthy Sino-
American relationship or auger for increased hostility and helped pave the way for a relatively frank 
and open discussion throughout the two days. Thereafter, each side discussed its own contemporary 
nuclear policy and space policy. In an effort to draw out discussions of escalation and crisis 
management based on an empirical case study, the meeting included a panel on recent nuclear 
developments in South Asia, with discussion focused on the lessons that can be learned for the 
United States and China. Finally, after the terminology sessions, there was a discussion of near and 
medium-term steps with regard to arms control and confidence building measures.   
 
For these traditional panels, each included two short presentations. These sessions were structured 
to maximize time for discussion rather than focus on vetted presentations. That goal was generally 
achieved, although the space security paper and presentation included more boilerplate than the 
nuclear discussions.  This is probably not surprising as this was the first time space security was 
included on the agenda.  Even on space security, however, the discussion proved productive and 
there were some interesting signals sent. Most participants regarded these discussions as relatively 
open and they displayed a particular lack of standard rhetoric on Taiwan. That said, and in contrast 
with recent sessions, repeated emphasis on “no-first-use” as a cure-all impeded productive and 




The meeting also included breakout sessions in which smaller groups of participants engaged in very 
informal discussions about the meaning of a dozen specific terms such as “war control” and 
“nuclear signaling.”  Each group was asked to discuss the meaning of the term, provide some 
broader context, and discuss the implications for U.S.-China relations. The goal was explicitly not to 
come to consensus definitions, but rather to understand the commonalities and differences of how 
the terms were used and gain some sense of their role in each side’s thinking about nuclear issues 
(some terms were more commonly used by one side than the other).  The resulting presentations 
served as the basis for a vigorous discussion in a plenary session the next day.    	  
CHINESE NUCLEAR STRATEGY 
The declared guiding principle for Beijing’s nuclear weapons policy is no-first-use (NFU), which 
Chinese participants emphasized throughout the dialogue. In the plenary and breakout discussions, 
NFU surfaced often in response to U.S. calls for greater Chinese transparency and NFU also 
hindered a deeper examination of Beijing’s potential responses in a crisis—despite the inclusion of 
Chinese terms in the dialogue’s breakout group discussions intended to provide deeper 
understanding. The Chinese side also repeatedly called on Washington to adopt an NFU stance to 
promote closer, less antagonistic ties. In particular, both a Chinese civilian and PLA-affiliated 
participant believed further Chinese transparency on nuclear capabilities would only be brought 
about by increased transparency on U.S. nuclear employment policy, and/or the adoption of an 
NFU stance. 
 
More than in previous dialogues, perhaps due to the nature of the discussion on escalation and 
crisis, Chinese participants emphasized that if they were forced to use nuclear weapons, China’s 
response would be akin to “massive retaliation” (though this phrase was never used), launching all 
nuclear weapons that survived the initial American attack.  Within the confines of a hypothetical 
nuclear crisis and response, Chinese participants emphasized NFU and massive retaliation. Chinese 
participants also argued that China’s reaction to a hypothetical first strike, even a limited strike, 
would necessitate a total Chinese retaliation with all available nuclear forces.  Chinese participants 
noted that given its small arsenal size, which would be further reduced after absorbing the first 
nuclear attack, China would be forced to launch all remaining nuclear weapons to ensure penetration 
of ballistic missile defenses (BMD).  One well-connected Chinese participant stated his “personal 
	  8	  
	  
opinion” of China’s requirements for effective deterrence and second-strike capability as having 
“one nuclear warhead” able to penetrate BMD. Although perhaps a bit of rhetorical flourish, this is 
more broadly consistent with messaging in previous meetings, during which Chinese participants 
emphasized that “a few” or a “handful of” warheads would be sufficient. 
 
Chinese participants generally viewed nuclear weapons to be of limited use and envisioned a very 
narrow range of potential contingencies that could involve nuclear weapons.  For instance, after a 
participant listed Taiwan, the Diaoyu Islands, and South China Sea as areas of potential U.S.-China 
conflict that might be linked to nuclear relations, other Chinese participants disagreed.  One PLA-
affiliated participant argued that only Taiwan rose to this level.  He suggested that lesser issues 
would be unlikely to involve nuclear weapons.  A Chinese researcher also disagreed with the PLA-
affiliated participant’s comments, noting that “most Chinese do not think that way.”  With regard to 
nuclear weapons in a Taiwan contingency, Chinese participants repeated that these weapons would 
not be used against Taiwan, but were less clear on whether they could be used against others during 
a conflict over Taiwan.  Chinese participants also emphasized that the only real nuclear threat to 
China came from the United States.  This contrasts somewhat with past meetings in which potential 
nuclear threats from India were raised (although one Chinese participant noted that newer Indian 
missiles and SSBNs might “challenge Sino-Indian nuclear relations a little bit.”) 
 
There was some ambiguity as to how China might respond to conventional attacks on Chinese 
nuclear forces.  A PLA-affiliated participant suggested that conventional attacks on “important 
military, political, and economic targets” could be cause for massive retaliation. He did not 
specifically mention nuclear use, and when pushed on whether this would include nuclear weapons, 
he suggested that it did not.  This is consistent with Chinese concerns in recent meetings about 
prompt global strike (PGS) and repeated signals that conventional attacks would have great 
consequences and bring a strong response, though it remains ambiguous as to whether or not this 
would include nuclear weapons.  In previous meetings, Chinese participants have noted that 
advances in conventional strike capabilities and the possibility of conventional attacks on nuclear 
forces might put increased pressure on China’s NFU.  Further discussions on this point likely serves 





Various definitions of stability and strategic stability were raised and discussed during the dialogue. 
Both sides seemed to agree that some form of stability in the relationship existed at present and 
hoped the other side would not take actions to undermine stability.  Chinese participants repeatedly 
raised developments in missile defense and conventional strike capabilities as negative factors and 
potential challenges to stability.  American participants repeatedly raised concerns about 
misperceptions and inadvertent signaling as a potential source of escalation in a crisis that might 
undermine stability.  
 
As in previous dialogues, Chinese participants welcomed language in the Nuclear Posture Review 
(NPR) that accepted strategic stability in bilateral relations, but questions were again raised about 
what the United States means.  One PLA-affiliated participant noted that it is “not clear what it 
[strategic stability] means.”  However, he and others viewed discussions of strategic stability as a 
positive development, and emphasized that it would differ from Soviet-U.S. strategic stability due to 
the lack of parity in force ratios.  This idea is consistent with writings from other PLA arms control 
and nuclear experts who have recently written about “a new type of strategic stability” (新型战略稳
定) in regards to Sino-American relations.  Chinese participants again raised the idea that an 
American NFU pledge would enhance strategic stability in relations, though the American side 
pointed out the difficulties in making such a change in policy.  Similar to suggestions by David 
Gompert and Phil Saunders,1 PLA-affiliated participant proposed the idea of “three no first attacks” 
(NFA) in nuclear, space, and cyberspace, as an idea that would enhance bilateral strategic stability. 
  
According to Chinese participants, however, strategic stability does not preclude crisis or 
competition between the two powers.  A Chinese PLA-affiliated participant argued “crises are 
inevitable and not totally bad” because it reminds leaders of the dangers of overextension and can 
release compressed “destructive energy.”  Although not recommending a nuclear crisis in U.S.-China 
relations, he noted the positive role the Cuban Missile Crisis ended up playing in enhancing U.S.-
Soviet stability and communications in the Cold War.  A Chinese civilian considered U.S.-China 
competition to be very likely, but emphasized that neither confrontation nor conflict was inevitable.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders, The Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strategic Restraint in an Era of 
Vulnerability (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2011).	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Chinese participants seemed much less worried about the potential for misperceptions or 
inadvertent signaling to lead to crisis escalation.  American participants repeatedly raised concerns 
about how either side could take actions in a crisis that would inadvertently threaten the other and 
lead to escalation, repeatedly asking how China would respond to hypotheticals.  Chinese 
participants responded by invoking their NFU, which impeded and limited discussions on this 
important issue.  Implicit in some of the Chinese responses was that if the United States was so 
concerned with the potential for escalation, it should not take actions that could prove escalatory. 
Chinese participants also did not engage on the potential relevance of the stability-instability 
paradox—which predicts nuclear and conventional stability are inversely correlated—to U.S.-China 
nuclear relations and the greater possibility of conventional crises that may lead to escalatory 
pressures.  
 
One dialogue session focused on comparative views of Indo-Pakistani strategic stability and nuclear 
doctrine in an effort to allow participants to talk about issues of escalation and stability in less 
sensitive ways, while also thinking about implications of this case for U.S.-China relations.  Although 
recognizing that the asymmetries in nuclear and conventional capabilities seemed similar, Chinese 
participants emphasized the differences between the two sets of relations—such as greater mutual 
interests between the United States and China who were great powers while India and Pakistan were 
not, and no possibility of a third party to manage and mediate a U.S.-China crisis. Chinese experts 
did not respond, however, when an American participant noted that some of those differences are 
reasons for optimism in the U.S.-China context, whereas others are reasons for greater concern 
about instability.   
 
Some of the more worrisome developments in the South Asian context do not seem to be occurring 
in the U.S.-China relationship.  For example, India’s “Cold Start” doctrine emphasizing rapid 
conventional response has pushed Pakistan to develop battlefield nuclear capabilities and use 
“automaticity” in its nuclear response to conventional attacks to enhance deterrence.  There are no 
signs of a similar destabilizing development in Chinese nuclear doctrine.  However, the Chinese did 
not respond to the suggestion by one American academic that Cold Start might be similar to Air-Sea 
Battle (ASB), and questioned whether advances in American conventional capabilities might force a 
rethinking in Chinese nuclear doctrine.  The engagement on the Chinese side was probably reduced 
by their limited expertise on South Asian nuclear dynamics, but the discussion was productive and 
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focused on nuclear issues and did not devolve into criticism of U.S. support for India or Chinese 
support for Pakistan.    
 
ESCALATION 
The Chinese side expressed worry that rebalancing and ASB would likely produce an unwanted arms 
race and undermine stability.   Many Chinese participants were clearly concerned about the negative 
impact of the rebalance on the strategic environment. These cautions, however, lacked a firmness 
that would indicate concrete decisions from Beijing had not yet been made on how to respond. 
Though concerns about arms races were repeatedly raised, Chinese participants did not explicitly 
raise concerns about the implications of rebalancing or ASB for escalation to the nuclear level. 
 
The South Asia session produced a brief discussion on the stories Chinese and American leaders 
might tell themselves on how Sino- American wars could be won. Two U.S. participants suggested 
that new approaches in the Western Pacific such as ASB might provide undue confidence to 
American policymakers. On the other hand, a Chinese researcher alluded to Beijing’s greater 
willingness to endure a fight over Taiwan when compared to America’s follow-through and 
willpower in a cross-strait crisis. After a testy back and forth, other Chinese participants admitted 
that the United States had vital interests in East Asia and in Taiwan in particular, but they 
conditioned this point with references to how China’s survival was at stake in a Taiwan crisis.  
 
Deployed and under-development U.S. conventional capabilities are alarming Beijing as rebalancing 
refocuses more of these capabilities into the Asia-Pacific theater. While this anxiety is not new, it 
was on display throughout the dialogue. Chinese attendees constantly linked the threat of new arm 
races in the Pacific to U.S. action.  (The U.S. side repeatedly highlighted the growth of Chinese 
missile and naval capabilities as well.)  One Chinese participant categorized new conventional strike 
capabilities as a rising threat and expressed a worry within China that escalation chains might raise 
“nuclear shadows.” At times however, the Chinese attendees admitted that their actions might play a 
role in the arms race dynamic. One Chinese delegate, in expressing concern on ASB, also indicated 
that he understood its development was in part due to Chinese A2/AD tactics and capabilities. In 




Chinese participants also cited nationalist pressure on Beijing to act in a crisis as a potential 
constraint on policy. One PLA-affiliated participant likened domestic memories of the 1999 
Belgrade bombing with American memories of Pearl Harbor and 9/11, a comparison that triggered 
palpable derision from the U.S. side (and some subsequent reconsideration by the Chinese 
participant). Another Chinese participant, noted “it’s very hard for [the] Chinese government to 
convince its own people [to be moderate],” and cited 1999 as a prime example.  
 
Three U.S. participants raised the issue of inadvertent or purposeful conventional strikes on Chinese 
nuclear assets. One way that might occur would be due to a lack of Chinese transparency regarding 
co-location of nuclear and conventional weapons leading to an inadvertent strike on nuclear forces.  
Chinese ambiguity on this issue and the potential for Second Artillery co-location raises the potential 
for escalation in a Sino-American confrontation.  The Chinese, however, did not engage on these 
escalation concerns and did not seem as worried as American counterparts about the potential for 
misperception or inadvertent escalation. 
 
There was some discussion by a PLA-affiliated participant about the possible deployment of 
Chinese SSBNs during times of crisis. This assessment links quite well with an earlier assertion that 
nuclear alert levels were raised in China only when under imminent nuclear threat. Thus, if Chinese 
SSBNs were observed to be surging in a crisis it may indicate nuclear confrontation is at hand and 
could help U.S. planners interpret Chinese actions or lack thereof in a crisis.  The U.S. side noted, as 
has occurred in previous dialogues, that this type of surge would be perceived as “nuclear signaling,” 
and could pose dangerous escalatory dynamics.   
 
ARSENAL SIZING 
Beijing outlines the goal of its arsenal to be the maintenance of “lean and effective” nuclear forces 
and Chinese interlocutors continued to emphasize the “lean” part of this sizing strategy. For 
example, a PLA-affiliated participant described his country’s arsenal as “very small.” Regarding 
effectiveness, he indicated “China [had] to have one nuclear warhead penetrate the U.S. missile 
defense system” for its second strike deterrence to be credible, a sizing requirement that allowed 
Beijing to maintain a small nuclear force. Nonetheless, given changes in U.S. capabilities, this 
calculus was flexible. Some Chinese commented that their nuclear capability’s sole target was the 
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United States, not Russia or India. Though this simplified targeting policy contrasted with how U.S. 
participants characterized their own arsenal in a complex, multiple-threat environment where 
American reductions were linked more with Russia and U.S. warheads had multiple actors in mind.  
Chinese participants also emphasized that nuclear retaliation would be complete, involving the 
launch of all nuclear weapons that survived a first strike.  
 
One of the Chinese delegates emphasized that Beijing’s nuclear ambitions did not seek parity or 
equivalent capability with the United States, only what he termed “minimum deterrence”—a 
dependable second strike capability. Interestingly, another Chinese attendee suggested that if U.S. 
and Chinese arsenals were more equal in size, China could adopt a broader range of potential 
nuclear responses (which could include nuclear warfighting, though he did not use this term here) 
and could have more nuclear signaling; but he also qualified this development as unlikely.   
 
The most likely pressure for increases in China’s arsenal, at least from the perspective of a majority 
of Chinese participants, was U.S. missile defense. During the discussion on (Missile Defense) 
Countermeasures (反措施/应对措施 ), a PLA-affiliated participant accused Washington of 
possessing both “the sword and shield”: a combination of missile defense and so-called U.S. first use 
policy. Consequently, several believed China might have to develop countermeasures, which could 
include increasing its number of warheads. Another Chinese participant suggested that as China 
increased its sea-based capabilities and multi-warhead maneuverable missiles, the United States 
might expand its missile defense program from its more limited current state. Thus, this spiraling 
interaction would push another round of arms racing in his opinion.  Again, building on previous 
dialogue meetings in Hawaii and Beijing, an important part of these threat perceptions are advanced 
BMD capabilities, which may have some capability against Chinese inter-continental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs). 
  
BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES (SSBNS) 
Chinese participants seemed more open to discussing both sides’ undersea capabilities than ever 
before. Still, it remains unclear how Beijing’s ballistic missile submarines integrate into their broader 
nuclear posture. There were hints at the adoption of potential bastioning strategies to protect 
Chinese SSBNs from U.S. and Japanese anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. 
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In response to another American scholar’s question regarding whether Beijing would have SSBNs 
on alert or surge them during a crisis, a Chinese participant suggested that Chinese SSBNs, when 
fully deployed, would not necessarily be continually on patrol.  Rather there would be regular, but 
not continual deployments.  
 
On a related note, U.S. submarine redeployments to the Pacific have generated obvious attention in 
China, as evidenced by the anxiety certain Chinese interlocutors displayed in discussing them. 
Toward the start of the dialogue, one Chinese participant referenced U.S. guided missile submarines 
(SSGNs) among a list of the recent concerns in China. Later, another Chinese delegate, citing 
Secretary Panetta’s Singapore speech and a 2006 U.S. policy document, alleged that the Obama 
administration’s rebalancing strategy involved the deployment of SSBNs to the Asia-Pacific region. 
An American rebuffed this claim, indicating that the speech and document referred to nuclear attack 
submarines (SSNs) not SSBNs. Nevertheless, it is clear that China continues to perceive an increase 
in deployments of ballistic missile submarines in Asia and is in general concerned by the increased 
amount of SSN and SSGN numbers off its coasts.     
 
U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE  
U.S. missile defense remained a persistent cause of concern for almost all Chinese participants 
throughout the dialogue. These concerns rested on an impression that missile defense was targeted 
at China and destabilizing because it challenged China’s nuclear deterrent. In the opening session, a 
PLA-affiliated participant listed missile defense as one of his main concerns in the strategic realm. 
Another Chinese attendee followed shortly with a question to the U.S. side regarding how 
rebalancing would affect missile defense deployments. (In reply, an American participant indicated 
that missile defenses were aimed at North Korea, Iran, and other rogue regimes.) Integration of 
Taiwan into a U.S. network of ballistic missile defense was also viewed as something of a "red line" 
for some Chinese participants.   Furthermore, a PLA-affiliated participant twice warned that Beijing 
would have to develop countermeasures in response to a U.S. missile defense system, which could 
include technological advances or an improvement in the quality or quantity of China’s nuclear 
arsenal. He also asserted that only one warhead had to penetrate U.S. missile defense for Beijing’s 
deterrent to be credible. This assertion was similar to ones in previous dialogues by others that “a 
few” or “a handful” of deliverable warheads was sufficient for credible deterrence. Another Chinese 
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participant made parallel points when addressing whether the United States pursued absolute or 
rational security. If the U.S. was trying to achieve absolute security, which was taken to mean a more 
comprehensive missile defense system in particular, he believed China would have to respond with 
increased ambiguity and secrecy, larger arsenals, decoys, and in the case of conflict, consideration of 
attacks on U.S. radar and early warning systems.   
 
On BMD countermeasures, American participants repeatedly warned their Chinese colleagues that 
the proliferation of countermeasure technology to rogue states such as North Korea would be 
viewed as highly escalatory and drive the United States to advance its capabilities and missile defense 
deployments. Yet, PLA-affiliated participant responded that North Korea could not launch a missile 
let alone develop countermeasures. 
 
On two occasions Chinese participants seemed to suggest their government had initially tolerated or 
at least been reserved in its protests toward U.S. missile defense. Regardless, the tone from the 
Chinese suggested this toleration had certainly waned (or more accurately, after a lull, has returned in 
force). One U.S. participant expressed irritation that Beijing had not given Washington enough 
credit on its actions taken to lessen Chinese concerns, in particular the termination of the multiple 
kill vehicle program. He also cautioned that countermeasure proliferation might force the United 
States to restore the furloughed program. A Chinese participant, however, responded dismissively, 
arguing that cuts to the multiple kill vehicles were not a concession to Chinese concerns but driven 
by shrinking budgets.  
 
Chinese participants briefly discussed their own missile defense program both in the breakout 
sessions and the plenary session. One Chinese delegate indicated China’s missile defense would be 
for “key points.” He did not define what key points meant exactly, but it likely relates to missile 
bases and command and control infrastructure since the comment was made in the context of 
discussing the need to defend nuclear installations. 
 
COUNTERMEASURES	  
Despite the inclusion of (Missile Defense) Countermeasures (反措施/应对措施) in the terms 
discussion, there was little detailed engagement. Instead, countermeasures were usually described 
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broadly and comprehensively. Chinese participants identified survivability through secrecy or 
concealment, arsenal increases, and maneuverable warheads all as countermeasures. According to a 
Chinese think tank participant, China’s policy-oriented literature did not offer much discussion on 
countermeasures. One PLA-affiliated participant observed that overall political relations framed 
Beijing’s decision on whether to deploy countermeasures. If Sino-American relations deteriorated, a 
more aggressive Chinese approach to countermeasures might be warranted. Similarly, a civilian 
participant asserted that China would adjust its behavior after assessing U.S. policy and capabilities, 
but currently Beijing was waiting for technological assessments of U.S. ballistic missile defense 
before deciding how to proceed.  	  
REGIONAL ISSUES 
SOUTH	  ASIA	  
The panel on South Asian nuclear dynamics was designed to elicit discussion on crisis stability and 
inadvertent escalation. While engagement on these topics as they pertained to Sino-American 
relations was modest, the Chinese did offer their understanding of the current crisis dynamics in the 
region. One Chinese attendee identified India and Pakistan as relatively “small countries” whose 
disputes could be mediated by the United States if diplomatic intervention became necessary. This 
seemingly relaxed attitude toward South Asian strategic issues, based in part on confidence in 
Washington’s ability to control the situation, may be overly optimistic.  U.S. participants noted that 
perspective several times during the discussions. According to a Chinese civilian, Pakistan had also 
learned something since the 2008 crisis, which led to an optimistic assessment about the future. Yet 
worryingly, the Chinese participant also admitted that within China’s South Asian policy community 
little debate and research delved into the region’s Indo-Pakistani nuclear dynamics. Chinese 
participants recognized that India paid much attention to China’s nuclear forces, but claimed that 
Beijing felt no threat from New Delhi.  
 
EAST	  ASIA	  
Besides Taiwan, North Korea garnered significant attention during the dialogue, mainly from 
exchanges initiated by American participants.  On multiple occasions, the American side tried to 
communicate to their Chinese colleagues that North Korean actions remained an important cause of 
ballistic missile defense in the Asia-Pacific and were also contributing to the military aspects of U.S. 
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rebalancing. In addition, U.S. participants several times emphasized that the transfer of 
countermeasure technology to North Korea might necessitate further and advanced missile defense 
deployments to the region. Still, the Chinese side generally remained unconvinced that missile 
defenses were solely aimed against Pyongyang. They believed only a small number of interceptors 
would be required if North Korea was the target, but did not quantify that amount. A U.S. 
participant indicated only 30-40 interceptors were currently deployed and that this number would 
not ramp up anytime soon, yet this did not quell Chinese anxiety (the subsequent increase of exactly 
those interceptors will likely be a topic in future discussions).  One Chinese participant also seemed 
alarmed by an American participant’s indication that a North Korean nuclear strike on the West 
Coast would necessitate a total U.S. retaliation, despite China’s similar strategic stance given an 
American first strike.  
 
During the CSBMs discussion, one PLA-affiliated participant questioned the continued role of 
extended deterrence in the region and identified Japan as a nuclear threshold power—similar to Iran 
but minus the lack of transparency. If some instigating event took place, which he linked with the 
Korean peninsula, the participant doubted Tokyo would rely on U.S. extended deterrence and 
instead believed Japan would develop its own capabilities. In part, he also asked that American 
extended deterrent commitments be reexamined if Washington sought to build better relations with 
China.  
 
TAIWAN	  	  	  	  	  
Throughout the dialogue the Taiwan issue did not become a major dispute. Although one PLA-
affiliated participant suggested a dispute over Taiwan was the only area that might escalate into the 
nuclear domain, he asserted that Beijing felt relaxed on Taiwan. He voiced worries about other 
issues, such as the shipping of nuclear triggers to Taiwan, but even this concern seemed muted.  
Furthermore, during the opening discussion on Chinese nuclear strategy, another PLA-affiliated 
participant emphasized that, in his opinion, no prospect for the use of nuclear weapons directly 
against Taiwan existed since Beijing considered the island part of China.  (This is consistent with 




The only contentious exchange over Taiwan involved a debate on the importance of political will in 
a hypothetical Taiwan crisis. Two Chinese attendees argued that despite U.S. interests in Taiwan, 
China’s will—therefore credibility—were much higher than America’s will to intervene in a cross-
strait crisis given the potential costs involved. A U.S. participant, however, warned Chinese 
colleagues not to underestimate U.S. interests and will, and suggested that doing so could be 
potentially destabilizing.  In this exchange there seemed to be some tacit acknowledgement that 
Washington did have legitimate interests regarding the Taiwan issue.   
 
SPACE 
A bilateral discussion of space security was included on the agenda for the first time with the 
permission of Chinese officials and military-affiliated think tanks, and a relevant expert presented on 
this topic.  His paper and presentation emphasized official policy pronouncements but there were 
also substantive discussions on space security and the expert offered some insightful observations 
during the discussion. 
 
In particular, during the question and answer portion of the space session, the Chinese presenter 
commented that no consensus had been reached in China as to the definition of a space weapon. 
This ambiguity owed to the difficulty of defining “outer space.” He then highlighted different ways 
the Chinese government wrestled with defining space weapons. Does the definition depend on the 
deployment or targeting position of the weapon?  The presenter closed by informing the dialogue 
that “the Chinese government is still open to all types of consultation on the definition of [these] 
weapons.” Another Chinese participant offered four different definitions of space weapons: 1) 
ground-based weapons that fly through space on their way toward a ground based target, 2) ground-
based weapons targeted at objects in space, 3) space-based weapons targeted at other objects in 
space, and 4) space-based weapons aimed at ground-based targets. He recommended the latter two 
should be considered space weapons while the former two should not.  Although some troubling 
and questionable examples were raised in this discussion for Americans, it is reassuring that none of 
the Chinese participants defined space weapons as weapons that traveled through space.  Again, it 
was clear the issue of jointly defining space weapons was regarded as a legitimate topic for 




The Chinese side acknowledged an intrinsic interaction between space/cyber and other domains and 
also displayed an emerging awareness that the United States views attacks on cyber or space as 
potentially very escalatory.  This discussion seemed to reflect an evolving Chinese understanding of 
the traditional dangers that attacking "national technical means" or early warning assets might have, 
as well as the potential for dangerous cascades to occur as a result of (further) kinetic attacks.   
 
The Chinese participants distrusted U.S. plans and pronouncements on space weapons—one 
speaker questioned whether the U.S. still pursued strategic defense initiative (SDI) related research 
on space-based interceptors. Another Chinese participant inquired as to whether the United States 
had a stated policy opposing the weaponization of space.  An American participant advised that 
although the United States had no stated policy, it did have a norm of non-weaponization.  (U.S. 
programs on missile defense, however, can complicate this norm.)  
 
Chinese participants also emphasized China’s developing country status and its role as protector of 
other developing countries’ rights in space.  Space security was characterized as a global issue and 
not just one for the United States, China, and other space faring nations.  A Chinese participant 
called for the inclusion of fairness and justice into principles of space security to address the 
interests of not-yet-space-faring nations. Regarding the rights and responsibilities of space-faring 
nations, one U.S. participant noted similarities between the Obama administration’s National Space 
Policy document and the Chinese presentation. He observed that many common interests existed, 
including the peaceful use of outer space for weather information, navigation, and the avoidance of 
purposeful interference, which dovetailed nicely with China’s concerns over the 2003 hacking of one 
of its satellites by Falun Gong. An American participant recommended that dialogues like this one 
identify common bilateral interests that could produce meaningful collaboration.  In response to a 
question from a U.S. participant on the utility of deterrence in space due to the lack of American 
political support for legally binding treaties, a Chinese delegate agreed that a possibility might be to 
treat all global positioning systems (GPS) as immune from attack, which might also deter 
confrontation. A U.S. participant responded positively to this proposal; further investigation on GPS 
cooperation could be an area worth pursuing for both sides at both the Track 1 and 2 levels. 
 
A Chinese speaker acknowledged that China and Russia knew the Treaty on the Prevention of the 
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT) required revision and thus welcomed U.S. 
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engagement on the matter. Chinese participants viewed instruments like the European Code of 
Conduct, however, as not substantial enough on their own when compared to PPWT because they 
were not legally binding. Still, the dominant view seemed to be that a Code of Conduct could work 
in parallel to the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space initiative (PAROS) and does not seek 
to dilute it. 
 
There was also confusion on the Chinese side regarding U.S. proposals to engage on an international 
code of conduct; this was viewed as the United States trying to impose its view on such a process 
and dominate it.  American participants emphasized that to the contrary the goal here was to ensure 
China and other powers had a seat at the table for these negotiations.  More positively, China did 
support Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures (TCBM), but again these activities would 
not substitute for legally binding instruments such as PPWT, which were meant to address 
deficiencies in the current international legal system.  
 
Chinese participants believed the successful economic development of space depended on 
strengthened space security treaties or as they referred to them, legally binding instruments or 
documents.  One Chinese speaker stated that China would support and actively engage in the United 
Nations Group of Governmental Experts on space security this coming year, which is a sign of 
progress. Another recommended a further area for confidence building might include a test 
moratorium. An American scholar agreed that a moratorium should be looked into.  
 
The issue of space verification was discussed a few times. There was no agreement on how 
verification could occur. One Chinese presenter doubted its practicability, while a U.S. participant 
argued verification was possible but difficult. Two U.S. participants agreed that verification required 
further discussion, but also would require the involvement of technical experts. The Chinese side 
generally agreed, but a Chinese delegate argued that a lack of trust from the U.S. side impeded 
progress—this concern specifically regarded the process of obtaining visas for Chinese technical 
experts.  
 
Several Chinese experts also complained that U.S. congressional politics impeded significant 
progress on space security. The American delegation offered a range of responses on these issues, 
noting the sources of these restrictions, but also with some suggesting that congressional restrictions 
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ironically affected mil-to-mil engagement on space issues less than the civilian side (i.e., prevention 
of NASA visits and satellite launches). Still, the Chinese were alarmed with congressional actions on 
this issue in general, and one argued that this lack of trust made it more difficult for China to 
support space security dialogues. 
 
CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES (CSBMS) 
The panel on potential confidence and security building measures yielded many ideas that will 
require further examination within each other’s respective governments.  Many ideas and 
suggestions were raised in other panels as well.  As in the past, the responses and reactions to these 
proposals will occur in future dialogues, after further reflection and discussion in both countries. 
 
On missile defense, the Chinese pushed for greater transparency.  For example, a Chinese presenter 
recommended China be allowed to observe missile defense tests and the data gleamed from them so 
as to build confidence in U.S. systems as non-threatening.  This approach follows the example of 
Russian-American cooperation on the issue. The U.S. side replied cautiously though, raising 
concerns about the potential for sharing data and insights with other actors, in particular North 
Korea.   The lack of trust between the two sides therefore impeded greater alleviation of Chinese 
concerns.  One U.S. participant also commented that the complexity of the U.S. missile defense 
program, for example optical/multi-spectrum sensing, made some kinds of transparency technically 
problematic. The Chinese also failed to understand the need for reciprocity in transparency. In 
response to a U.S. participant’s statement that transparency was a two way street, a PLA-affiliated 
participant suggested that China would not be able to be as forthcoming due to its lack of equivalent 
capabilities relative to the United States and the lack of a U.S. no-first-use policy. Other Chinese 
participants made similar points during the dialogue.  
 
After the CSBM presentation, one American participant suggested that given the Chinese side’s 
aversion to transparency efforts, the U.S. might want to place more emphasis on legal verification 
and less on transparency. Consequently, he asked his Chinese colleagues if a “legalistic and binding 
verification mechanism” might be a different and more productive approach. One Chinese 
delegation member responded in the affirmative, recommending that these mechanisms also be 
multilateral, not bilateral and perhaps private rather than public.  
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Similar to David Gompert and Phillip Saunders’ work on mutual restraint, one Chinese participant 
proposed the idea of “three non-first attacks” (3NFA) in nuclear, space, and cyberspace.  He 
believed limiting conflict to just one of these domains was impossible. According to him, “reciprocal 
commitments” by both sides to 3NFA would be “a big realistic step to China-U.S. strategic mutual 
trust” and strategic stability. 
 
Another Chinese participant provided some interesting statements on Chinese policy responses to 
U.S. entreaties. For example, a Chinese participant suggested that Chinese ratification of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty would rapidly follow a similar move by the United States. 
(This resonated with Chinese signaling at previous Track 2 dialogues.)  More significantly, a speaker 
suggested if Russo-American arsenal cuts continued down to 900-1,000, it might represent a 
threshold that would allow Beijing’s participation in global arms control negotiations. The space 
session raised areas for potential cooperation including the need to hold a larger conversation on 
how GPS systems should be treated. For example, did the system’s status as a global utility deter the 
weaponization of space? Another Chinese participant also suggested further conversations were 
needed on space traffic management due to the crowding of Earth’s orbits with debris.  
 
The Chinese voiced some displeasure at the lack of reciprocal lab visits that they thought owed to 
them by the United States. Consequently, this perceived lack of reciprocity acted as an impediment 
to deeper trust and confidence. Finally, during the breakout session discussions on cross-domain 
deterrence, several U.S. and Chinese participants agreed that the idea of cyber hotlines might help 






PART. 2: DEFINITIONAL BREAK-OUT GROUP DISCUSSIONS 
Part of the dialogue, as with several of the past sessions, centered around dividing the conference 
participants into “breakout groups,” each of which discussed each side’s understanding of the 
meaning of various terms.  The conference organizers encouraged representatives from each side to 
suggest candidate terms prior to the conference.  From these and those the organizers included, nine 
were selected.  Three are primarily “academic” in nature (stability/instability paradox, nuclear taboo, 
and nuclear signaling); three come from Chinese doctrinal publications (close protection, war 
control, and countermeasures); and the last three come from American policy statements (air-sea 
battle, rebalancing, and cross domain deterrence). A participant from each side was asked to draft a 
“one page” discussion of the terms (both sides contributed one pagers for the academic terms, and 
each side gave a one pager on their own term).  These were circulated prior to the meeting and 
served as the basis for the breakout group sessions and later for the presentations of the terms to the 
plenary session.  Each term is discussed below in turn. 
 
CLOSE PROTECTION ( 密防 ) / SURVIVABILITY 
Close protection ( 密防 ) is a term used in Chinese documentary sources (both open and 
internal) to describe an element of Beijing’s nuclear strategy. Unfortunately, it was the only term for 
which a “one page” statement was not provided; nevertheless, the discussion produced some 
valuable new ideas. The term appears to connote a fairly broad set of means to protect basing for 
nuclear weapons from a wide range of threats. This protection side of Chinese thinking about 
nuclear strategy is related to survivability, but differs a bit from the way it would be understood in 
the United States.   
 
Initially one Chinese speaker voiced concern that the Chinese side could not broach the specifics of 
close protection ( 密防 ) due to a lack of expert knowledge in the room; however, the ensuing 
discussion engaged the term’s broader application. Furthermore, an explanation of three U.S. Cold 
War strategies related to survivability, especially an American participant’s reference to 
maneuverable and hidden SSBNs, helped move the discussion toward a deeper Chinese dialogue on 




As in previous meetings, open disagreement or lack of coordination was visible between certain 
elements within the PLA. One Chinese participant identified close protection ( 密防 ) with The 
Science of Second Artillery Campaigns (SSAC) and the Second Artillery, which in his opinion meant it did 
not apply to the PLA Navy. Another participant disagreed and indicated the term concerned base or 
site security and “keeping the operational area safe” from potential nuclear, conventional, special 
operations, and terrorist threats in wartime. He argued that this concept also applied to the maritime 
domain, where SSBNs and their bases demanded protection, especially from “strong” Japanese and 
American anti-submarine warfare capabilities. In an effort to elicit further clarity on Chinese SSBN 
strategy, a U.S. participant asked whether this characterization might be similar to the Soviet strategy 
of bastioning. Some on the Chinese side nodded approval.  
 
It became clear through the terminology discussion that protection (防 ) was narrower than 
defense (防御). Furthermore, China’s current protection strategy aims to enhance survivability and 
prevent attacks on nuclear forces and facilities rather than advance active defense, e.g. missile 
defense. During Mao’s reign, Chinese nuclear strategy had been more concerned with defending 
population centers. Nevertheless, according to two Chinese participants, Beijing’s strategy now 
leaned toward warhead and facility protection.    
 
The terminology discussion also brought up China’s recently publicized tunneling efforts, which one 
Chinese speaker identified as another aspect of close protection. According to him, the tunnels 
helped ensure a second strike capability and kept vulnerable nuclear weapons “off the roads”; thus, 
tunneling was a method of concealment and protection rather than an effort “to hide a growing 
arsenal.” Another Chinese attendee addressed these tunneling efforts and implied that the 
“underground great wall” project only aims to ensure Beijing’s second strike capability.  
 
Although one U.S. participant suggested some methods of force protection might serve as implicit 
nuclear signals, the Chinese side remained reluctant to agree with such a characterization.  
 
The discussion on close protection ( 密防  ) also provided an opportunity for the U.S. 
participants to reiterate concerns about the different challenges faced by the Chinese Navy and 
Second Artillery, who control different parts of Beijing’s nuclear capabilities. The apparently weak 
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integration between them and great uncertainties regarding the nature of command and control at 
sea might prove detrimental to crisis management and will need to be monitored into the future.    
 
THE STABILITY INSTABILITY PARADOX (SIP) 
This paradox has roots in the early Cold War and provided a theoretical explanation for deeper 
engagement in proxy Soviet-American conflicts such as Vietnam. Put simply, the paradox states that 
nuclear and conventional stability are inversely related. Therefore, if states achieve strategic stability 
they may be more inclined toward provocative conventional action since each is aware that nuclear 
confrontation remains unlikely. A U.S. participant expanded the definition out to other domains, 
even positing that conventional stability could provide increased risk for lower intensity 
conventional skirmishes.  
 
The Chinese side pointed to the term’s Cold War origins as another symbol of outdated concepts 
being inappropriately applied to the U.S.-China relationship; in general, both sides admitted the term 
had questionable value. The term proposes that political relations be understood through a nuclear 
lens, which a Chinese participant rejected in the breakout session because Beijing did not conduct 
policy through a nuclear lens but a political one; a U.S. participant also voiced his agreement with 
this point. A PLA-affiliated participant discarded the paradox entirely, instead, arguing that strategic 
stability lessened conventional instability. On the other hand, another Chinese participant suggested 
a form of strategic stability might exist in cyberspace due to cyber-MAD (mutually assured 
destruction), which implied that lower level cyber exploitation or attack may be logical given Sino-
American nuclear stability. Two U.S. participants, however, quickly countered that the ambiguities of 
cyberspace lacked clear redlines or thresholds to prevent escalation. This response led him to 
recommend bilateral, consensus driven negotiations on the prevention of cyber-attacks.  
 
A non-nuclear Taiwan confrontation would seem to fit within the paradox, but a lack of willingness 
to engage the Taiwan issue in this context precluded it from being touched on during the breakout 
session. After being brought up in the plenary session by the U.S. side, a Chinese participant 
responded that U.S.-China strategic nuclear stability precluded cross-strait conflict, again 




Nuclear signals may be a variety of actions intended to convey the credibility of a states’ nuclear 
weapons capability and its willingness to utilize it, but signaling does not inherently involve weapon 
use. The discussion on the term highlighted the impediments China’s no-first-use (NFU) create on 
discussions of potential Chinese actions and understandings how they may be perceived by others. It 
also exposed fundamental definitional differences between the two sides. Despite these problems, 
U.S. efforts to probe and highlight to Chinese participants what the United States understood as 
signals, at least made the definitional differences clearer to all involved.   
 
The Chinese delegation emphasized the negative and coercive connotation Beijing ascribed to the 
term. This negativity resulted from a belief that signaling through nuclear weapons prior to an 
adversary’s first strike could be construed as an abrogation of NFU. Yet, while NFU complicated 
the discussion, lengthy American questioning brought about some acknowledgement and discussion 
regarding certain Chinese actions that might also be signals. From the American perspective, 
signaling is not inherently coercive and can act as a potential method of escalation deterrence. 
Among most of the Chinese, nuclear signaling was deemed escalatory and “provocative.” There 
were two exceptions to this majority Chinese view. A PLA-affiliated participant advised that China 
might “learn something” from U.S. views on signaling as an assurance mechanism and another 
Chinese participant pondered whether signals could act as confidence and security building 
mechanisms (CSBMs) to de-escalate during a crisis. Americans in the small group that discussed the 
term raised U.S.-Russian efforts to engender transparent nuclear signaling through dialogues and 
arms control; the capstone example being mutual ballistic missile launch notification.  The Chinese 
side had not previously considered this more positive and constructive aspect of signaling.  
 
One PLA-affiliated participant acknowledged that China engaged in passive and reactive nuclear 
signaling. These forms of signaling were meant to “demonstrate the reliable capability of counter 
strike” by “improving the survivability and strengthening of the nuclear arsenal and successful tests.” 
While the PLA-affiliated participant also acknowledged that nuclear tests or the raising of alert levels 
might be understood as signaling, he simultaneously countered that some in China viewed these 
actions solely as routine capability enhancements, not signals. He also noted that Chinese nuclear 
forces were placed on alert only when “under imminent threat.” Instead, the participant emphasized 
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that public statements from official sources (such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of 
National Defense, and the Second Artillery) would be the most reliable form of signaling.   
Conversely, another Chinese participant described China’s nuclear signaling in the 1969 crisis with 
the Soviets: according to him, given Moscow’s hostile nuclear intent, Second Artillery preparations 
had a deterrent effect on Soviet adventurism. In response to this point, a PLA-affiliated participant 
argued that Chinese nuclear forces were placed on alert only when “under imminent threat.” The 
complex issue of understanding whether something constitutes a signal or not provides fertile 
ground for misperception—particularly across distinct cultures where one favors strategic 
ambiguity—and will require further dialogue and definitional exercises to tease out cognitive 
dissonance. Consequently, participants agreed during small group discussions that direct contacts 
through thicker mil-to-mil linkages would be helpful. 
 
Both sides shared a belief that authoritative documents in peacetime could function as signals. One 
PLA-affiliated participant emphasized the use of official documents, declaratory policy, and 
statements from Ministry of National Defense or Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesmen as Chinese 
approaches toward reinforcing their second strike deterrent. He also suggested that the Second 
Artillery used media relations to convey messages. During small group discussions, one Chinese 
participant also considered a range of nuclear signals in the abstract, such as: nuclear warfare, nuclear 
capabilities, and broader intention signaling.  This was not specifically connected to Chinese strategy.  
 
In the plenary session, a U.S. participant probed a PLA-affiliated participant on the implications of 
PLA peacetime deployment patterns for inadvertent signaling, specifically whether Beijing would 
surge SSBNs in a crisis. In response, the Chinese participant anticipated that when China’s new 
SSBN was operational it would be on a routine but not constant 24/7 patrol. In the case of an 
“imminent nuclear strike” against China, the seaward deployment of SSBNs was one possibility. He 
characterized an SSBN surge as a preparatory measure for nuclear retaliation, rather than an example 
of nuclear signaling.  
 
AIR-SEA BATTLE (ASB) 
Commentary from the Chinese side regarding ASB was notably muted given Chinese interest in the 
topic. A U.S. academic in the room provided the traditional boilerplate statement that ASB was not 
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solely about China and highlighted the concept’s utility in the Strait of Hormuz. His term definition 
paper also emphasized the competing bureaucratic rationales and infighting behind the concept’s 
development. Stress was placed on ASB’s call for command and control (C2) targeting, which may 
present risks of escalation.  
 
Interestingly, one Chinese participant acknowledged that ASB may have in part grown out of U.S. 
fears from Chinese anti-access/areas-denial (A2/AD) strategies concerning Taiwan. He warned, 
however, that with cross-strait relations on the mend, the utility of A2/AD and ASB should wane. If 
not, according to him, there would be increased prospects for a new arms race.  
 
This followed similar statements from other Chinese participants regarding the anxiety inducing 
conventional capabilities of the United States and their potential for causing an arms race. The 
discussion also highlighted Chinese uncertainty on whether ASB is in part preemptive of further 
Chinese A2/AD capabilities or a response to current Taiwan contingencies and Beijing’s already 
developed forces and tactics. On a side note, the Chinese side also voiced concern that the mention 
of Iran and China in the same breath regarding ASB was unnecessarily inflammatory. 
 
WAR CONTROL ( 争控制) 
The more exact term according to the Chinese participant who submitted a discussion paper is War 
Situation Control ( 局控制), which attempts to capture the need for Chinese military planners to 
prevent the escalation of war once conflict is at hand. The term’s usage was said to be solely 
conventional and involved two interlinked meanings: 1) preparation prior to the outbreak of war so 
as to mitigate danger and crisis escalation; and 2) actions whilst in conflict to prevent spill over into 
other domains or theatre level escalation, which might include threats of a long and drawn out fight. 
 
Chinese participants believed firmly that this term referred only to non-nuclear confrontation. A 
Chinese analyst summed up this reasoning succinctly: “We do not think nuclear weapons are usable” 
because “once war has gone nuclear it can’t be controlled.” His conception differs from an 
American academic and policy perspective that recognizes the possibility of “limited nuclear 
options.” According to a PLA-affiliated participant, the term remained “purely conventional” as well 
and focused on avoiding escalation of local and limited wars into other realms. Yet, to control war 
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an actor must seize and maintain the initiative, which the U.S. side linked to escalation dominance 
and the possibility of inadvertent escalation through aggressive or offensive signaling.  
 
Although the term did not relate to nuclear use, some Chinese attendees did espouse the view that 
any nuclear attack on China, no matter size or selectivity, would necessitate a total Chinese response, 
which inherently lacked any form of control or management. Specifically, according to a PLA-
affiliated participant, “everything” would be launched. One U.S. participant appreciated this Chinese 
stance since a small arsenal afforded Beijing little ability for follow-on or more phased targeting 
during a nuclear level war. Following that statement, a Chinese participant allowed guardedly that 
theoretically if Beijing’s arsenal size changed in a way that brought it in line with America’s, a more 
discriminating targeting policy in Beijing might be considered. 
 
Three U.S. participants raised the issue of inadvertent or purposeful conventional strikes on Chinese 
nuclear assets. One way that might occur would be due to a lack of Chinese transparency regarding 
dual-capable ballistic missiles and the mixed basing of nuclear and conventional weapons together. 
Chinese participants responded firmly to such discussions. A PLA-affiliated participant used the 
example of the 1999 Belgrade Embassy bombing to explain that conventional strikes on Beijing’s 
nuclear assets would enrage the Chinese public. Thus, Beijing would have trouble convincing or 
controlling public outcry for retaliation even if an attack was mistaken.  
 
In response to a question from a U.S. participant, a Chinese participant acknowledged that war 
control in space and cyber had received little attention within China. One reason being that China 
perceived the United States as viewing attacks in the cyber realm as highly escalatory. If this 
understanding is more widely agreed on within China’s national security community, it would be 
tacit admission that certain cyber thresholds exist. 
 
REBALANCING 
An American speaker opened the discussion on rebalancing by making clear that the concept was 
not altogether military-centric. Instead, he made an effort to talk about the economic and diplomatic 
initiatives inherent in U.S. rebalancing. In reply, a Chinese participant offered a balanced assessment 
of the term’s current play in international dialogue. While China emphasized the military aspects of 
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rebalancing, he believed the United States played up the economic and diplomatic components to 
make up for strategy’s more tangible military elements. He also surmised that rebalancing would lead 
to a more competitive U.S.-China relationship but counseled that competition did not imply 
confrontation. Later in the discussion one U.S. participant reminded Chinese colleagues that North 
Korean intransigence also contributed to the military aspects of rebalancing.   
 
One Chinese participant suggested that China had not been excluded from the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP). A U.S. participant pushed back on this assertion, arguing that China had offered 
no willingness to meet the conditions to become part of TPP, but states such as Malaysia and 
Vietnam were moving in that direction.  Despite this back and forth on economic issues, the military 
aspects of rebalancing took center stage for the remainder of the discussion. On multiple occasions 
Chinese participants raised concerns on how nuclear assets fit into America’s shift toward the 
Pacific. The primary reply, from the U.S. side, was that nuclear capabilities had no formal inclusion 
in rebalancing. Inherently, however, rebalancing involves the allocation of additional U.S. 
submarines into the Asia-Pacific, which seems to have caused a misreading within China. Several 
times one Chinese speaker asserted that American SSBN numbers were increasing in the Pacific. 
First, he referenced Secretary Panetta’s Shangri-La speech as indicating an increased deployment of 
SSBNs. When this assertion was rebuffed, he then referenced a 2006 U.S. policy document, which 
according to him stated that 60% of U.S. submarines were being deployed to Pacific Command 
(PACOM). The U.S. side rejected this allegation as referring to SSNs not SSBNs. 
 
This participant’s points may be minor misinterpretations, but his uneasiness on the SSBN threat 
was shared by other Chinese attendees.  Another point of contention raised by another speaker 
revealed a Chinese tendency to utilize Department of Defense documents, specifically the January 
2012 Strategic Guidance, as the framework for understanding rebalancing in general. U.S. speakers 
directed the Chinese to look at documents from other government agencies not just the Defense 
Department, to develop a more comprehensive understanding of rebalancing’s implications. 
 
Rounding out the discussion, one Chinese participant, while accepting that America had legitimate 
interests in the Asia-Pacific that might require increased resources, cautioned U.S. policymakers that 
as the leading power they had “a responsibility to care about other’s legitimate security concerns.” 
Consequently, he asked for further transparency on rebalancing as it related to nuclear assets and 
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missile defense deployments; throughout the dialogue, however, he eschewed similar calls from the 
U.S. side for enhanced Chinese transparency.  
 
NUCLEAR TABOO 
Facilitated by term framing papers, both sides came to the table with similar understandings of the 
concept. Nonetheless, a lack of deep Chinese theorizing on the nuclear taboo and predictable 
complaints regarding U.S. no-first-use (NFU) ambiguity contributed to a plenary session discussion 
of the Nuclear Taboo focused on critiques of American policy.  
 
One Chinese delegate viewed even the discussion of nuclear use as taboo, but during “emergency 
crises” he sensed constraints on policymakers to use nuclear weapons might diminish—especially in 
the West. To an extent, one U.S. participant agreed, observing that the “taboo only exists to a 
certain threshold.” The Chinese delegate’s more general dissatisfaction with U.S. nuclear posture 
stemmed from a belief that Beijing’s NFU stance provided it the moral high ground on nuclear 
issues since NFU went beyond just a normative taboo. In addition, he fingered U.S. policy as 
degrading the taboo when American war planners opted for nuclear solutions to issues that 
conventional capabilities could not solve. 
 
Within the breakout group, a U.S. participant pondered whether the taboo in the United States 
might be stronger than declaratory policy. Policy could change easily; yet, the taboo shaped and 
functioned at an elevated decision-making level. Likewise, a U.S. participant tried to explain why the 
United States lacked a clear-cut NFU declaration, namely that a political “reluctance to limit in 
advance the options” open to the president was the culprit. Furthermore, he acknowledged that this 
reluctance justifiably confused the Chinese. Still, he reiterated a point made throughout the dialogue: 
the lack of an NFU did not imply Washington practiced a first use policy. After these points were 
made, a Chinese participant repeated calls for the United States to strengthen the taboo by accepting 
an NFU policy, arguing that much of the work nuclear weapons were designed for could now be 
resolved conventionally. 
 
In response to a comment from a U.S. observer both sides agreed that the nuclear taboo should not 
extend into the military, which according to a Chinese participant must follow orders.  Both groups, 
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however, offered up asides that some in the military may not conform to the taboo and American 
participants were more open to discussing this alarming possibility. Another area of widespread 
agreement—due to similar starting definitions—regarded the key role social pressure played in 
cementing the taboo in the early years of the Cold War and into today. 
  
CROSS-DOMAIN DETERRENCE (CDD) 
Chinese and American concerns on cross-domain escalation, attribution in these newer domains, 
and the possibility for misperception as both states navigate unfamiliar territory loomed large in this 
discussion. The space and cyber domains garnered the most attention and Chinese and American 
participants alike shared the term’s general implication that “deterrence in space or cyberspace 
cannot be domain limited.” 
 
In the breakout group, a U.S. analyst recommended one goal for bilateral talks should be the 
“explicit” outlining of “what would happen if [one side] was backed into a corner.” In addition and 
especially regarding cyber, a U.S. participant called for a deeper delineation of clear and specific 
retaliatory actions that would provide comparable cost without risking escalation. The development 
and communication of these actions could provide a deterrent effect. It became clear in the plenary 
and breakout group that open lines of communication to limit inaccurate and provocative 
attribution would also be necessary. While attribution in space held less inherent difficulty, the 
difficulties of cyber attribution left both sides anxious. Indeed, the CDD discussion led more to 
questions in needs of answers than solutions. For example, the Chinese, particularly one PLA-
affiliated participant, offered frequent expressions of “we haven’t figured out how to think about 
cyber [or] space” issues in relation to cross-domain deterrence or war control. On the other hand—
although specific capabilities were not mentioned—Chinese interlocutors cautioned that new 
American efforts to maintain dominance in specific domains would lead to increased tension and 
arms racing. 
 
The Chinese side acknowledged an intrinsic interaction between space/cyber and other domains and 
also displayed an emerging awareness that the United States views attacks on cyber or space as 
potentially very escalatory.  This discussion seemed to reflect an evolving Chinese understanding of 
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the traditional dangers that attacking "national technical means" or early warning assets might have, 
as well as the potential for dangerous cascades to occur as a result of (further) kinetic attacks.   
 
Attribution is a hotly debated issue in Washington’s cyber talking shops and from Chinese probing it 
would seem the same is true for Beijing. One Chinese attendee pondered how intentional attacks 
should be defined as compared to accidents and another voiced a concern that mischievous hackers 
could bring the United States and China to blows. In response, a U.S. participant proposed a cyber-
hotline meant to combat mistaken attribution. This proposal did not fall on deaf ears; one Chinese 
interlocutor even referred to it as a “good idea.”  
 
Throughout the dialogue but particularly when discussing CDD, the Chinese delegation seemed to 
display a greater awareness of U.S. warnings that cyber or space attacks were deemed highly 
escalatory. Increased awareness may be a result of cautious notices from American participants 
emphasizing the possibility that attacks in one domain may not incur retaliation in the same domain. 
Finally, both sides acknowledged mutual vulnerability in the space and cyber domains, which means 
the time is now ripe for bilateral agreements or frameworks to lock in mutual vulnerability. Previous 
non-interference pledges negotiated with the Soviets during the Cold War may provide some basis 
for the above proposition.   
 
(MISSILE DEFENSE) COUNTERMEASURES (反措施 /  措施) 
The breakout and plenary discussion on countermeasures lacked technical specificity. Consequently, 
the discussion focused on the broader political implications of countermeasures. More to the point, 
however, the U.S. side acknowledged that it seemed logical for China to consider a countermeasure 
program if Beijing believed its minimum deterrent was at risk. U.S. missile defense deployments to 
the Asia-Pacific—termed the “pursuit of absolute security” by one PLA-affiliated participant—
posed the greatest chance of provoking China’s countermeasure development according to some 
participants. Chinese participants defined countermeasures very broadly. For example, one counted 
secrecy as a countermeasure and more generally the building up of warhead numbers was also 
included. American attendees mentioned concepts such as more technologically sophisticated 




Two Chinese participants argued that U.S.-China political relations framed Beijing’s decision on 
whether to develop countermeasures. Since current relations were stable, no need existed. Yet, both 
cautioned that changed Sino-American dynamics could alter this calculus. To prevent this change, a 
Chinese participant recommended certain measures be implemented to assuage Chinese fears that 
U.S. missile defense was aimed at Beijing. The construction of a shared early warning radar was not 
particularly useful but the idea of further data exchange—on the closing speed of U.S. 
interceptors—or formal observations to highlight the limited ambitions of U.S. missile defense did 
raise mutual agreement for further consultation. The request for greater transparency, however, was 
based on assumptions that China must not proliferate countermeasures to North Korean and must 
make efforts toward greater transparency. If proliferation occurred it would require advanced U.S. 
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Seventh U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue 
“US-China Strategic Dynamics through Multiple Lenses” 
Co-hosted by NPS; Pacific Forum CSIS;  
and China Arms Control and Disarmament Association 




FRIDAY, JUNE 8 
 
0830-0900  Opening and Welcome 
 
0900-1030  General Strategic Threat Perception and Role of Nuclear Weapons in 
National Strategies 
 
How does each side view its strategic situation (where “strategic” centers on 
nuclear issues, but extends beyond)? What new threats have arisen in the past few 
years?  How does each side’s strategic policy (including any adjustments in 
forces) address those strategic threats?   
 
1045-1245 Lessons from Comparative Views of India/Pakistan Strategic Stability and 
Nuclear Strategy/Doctrine   
 
How does each side understand the strategic situation in South Asia?  Was there a 
serious risk of intentional or unintentional escalation to the strategic level in the 
recent 1999 and 2001 crises? Are there any dangers of “losing control” of the 
situation? Have any recent changes by either side put greater pressure on 
maintaining stability (e.g., Indian Cold Start operational concepts and Pakistan’s 
evolving nuclear policy)?  What role have CSBMs played in addressing these 
dangers? 
 
1415-1630 Breakout Discussions of Terminology 
   
Three groups, American and Chinese participants on each, will discuss a mix of 
terms.  One-page discussions will be distributed in advance. 
 
Nuclear Taboo, Cross Domain Deterrence, Close protection (严密防护) / 
Survivability, Stability/Instability Paradox, Rebalancing, Nuclear Signaling, Air-




SATURDAY, JUNE 9 
 
0830-1145 Terminology Plenary Sessions (i.e., breakout group outbriefs) 
 
 
1300-1445 Space Security: National Threat Perceptions and Common Interests  
 
What are each side’s views of their central security interests in outer space? What 
threatens those interests and stability in the space security environment? What is 
each side’s space security policy? How is space security related to strategic (i.e., 
nuclear) security and stability? What potential areas of cooperation exist for the 
U.S. and China in space security? What might be included in a code of conduct to 
mitigate dangers? 
 
1500-1630 Multilateral CSBMs/Reassurances/Transparency 
 
Building on previous meeting’s discussions of bilateral measures, and cognizant 
of ongoing P-5 efforts, what are the most likely prospects of a multilateral nature? 
 
 
1630-1700 Wrap up and Conclusion 
 	  
